St. John's Law Review
Volume 40, December 1965, Number 1

Article 50

CPLR 3103: Non-Resident Defendant Entitled to Reimbursement
for EBT Expenses
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1965]

BIANNUAL SURVEY

In the prior case, Colbert was the defendant and Home Indemnity, his insurer, had secured reports of the accident which
reports were in the files of a former agent at the time of the
institution of the present action. The court held that the reports
sought were "material and necessary in the prosecution" of plaintiff's action and therefore were a proper subject for disclosure.
In distinguishing this situation from the one in Finegold, the
court stated that in the prior action defendants were working
primarily for plaintiff (in the instant case) when they gathered
the evidence sought to be disclosed here, and that, therefore, it
was immaterial where they (defendants) stood in the present
action.
No protection for the non-liability insurer
In Raylite Elec. Corp. v. New York Fire Ins. Co., 8 7 plaintiffinsured sought discovery of the reports prepared for the defendantinsurer by a fire adjuster and a property damage expert. The
court held that such reports did not become "material prepared
for litigation" merely by virtue of their being turned over to
an attorney. The court distinguished this case from Kandel solely
on the ground that no liability insurance was involved herein.
Thus, it would appear that where other than liability insurance
is involved, the party seeking to preclude disclosure must show
that the material was in fact prepared for the express purpose of
litigation and not merely in the ordinary course of business unmotivated by the thought of litigation. Situations can certainly be
imagined wherein a non-liability insurer could be doing work which
could more easily be classified as "material prepared for litigation"
than that of a liability insurer. In such situations, the net result
of these cases is that the non-liability insurer would be put to
the proof on the question of whether the work is material prepared for litigation whereas the liability insurer would enjoy a
presumption (if not a conclusion) that it is. Such, however, is
the present state of the law.
CPLR 3103:

Non-resident defendant entitled to reimbursement
for EBT expenses.

The notion that protective orders are not a proper means for
requiring one party to pay the other's disclosure expenses'" seems
to be losing strength. An indication of this can be found in
Buffone v. Aronson'8 9 wherein defendant Aronson, a resident of
287

46 Misc. 2d 361, 259 N.Y.S2d 641 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1965).

Pakter v. Eli Lilly & Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 810, 243 N.Y.S.2d 425
(1st Dep't 1963), would appear to convey such a notion.
18945 Misc. 2d 454, 257 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1965).
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Massachusetts, requested that the place of an EBT be changed
to Massachusetts and, in addition, that plaintiff and co-defendant
pay his attorney's expenses. The court denied these requests 190
since defendant Aronson was subject to examination in New York
as a party to the action pursuant to CPLR 3110(1), and since
there were no unusual circumstances present which would work
a hardship on him. 91 However, the court did require reimbursement to defendant of his travel expenses incurred in attending
the EBT since he neither stood in the shoes of a plaintiff nor
interposed a counterclaim. That this was ordered by the court
on its own initiative is not unusual since implied authority is
provided therefor in CPLR 3101(a).
CPLR 3103: Inapplicable to CPLR 3123 in advance of trial.
In Schwartz v. Macrose Lumber & Trim Co., 9 2 defendant
sought a protective order' 93 so as not to be required to answer
questions in plaintiff's notice to admit.2'9
The court in denying
defendant's motion held that CPLR 3103 was inapplicable to CPLR
3123 in advance of trial. It stated that 3123 is virtually a reenactment of CPA § 322 and that the cases interpreting the latter
section precluded an attack on a notice to admit. 195 Therefore,
the court reasoned that the same conclusion would have to be
reached under the CPLR.9'0 It would appear from an examination
of 3103(a) that a strong argument can be made for granting a
protective order to prevent the testing of a notice to admit in
advance of trial.:"" The subdivision is broadly worded:
The court may at any time . . . make a protective order denying,
limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device. 98
Such wording would not appear to warrant the unequivocal statement made by the court that 3103 does not permit such an attack
upon a notice to admit. On the contrary, the language of 3103 (a)
190 CPLR 3110(1) renders any party to an action subject to examination
"where the action is pending."
291 CPLR 3103 (a) governs such situations.
.19246 Misc. 2d 202, 259 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965).
'93 The protective order was sought pursuant to CPLR 3103.
194 Plaintiff's notice to admit had been served pursuant to CPLR 3123.
o As authority for this statement, the court cited Belfer v. Dictograph
Prods., Inc., 275 App. Div. 824, 89 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1st Dep't 1949), and
Langan v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 270 App. Div. 700, 62 N.Y.S.2d 440
(4th Dep't 1946), aff'd without opinion, 296 N.Y. 1014, 72 N.E2d 723

(1947).
196.See 3 WEINSTEIN, KoRN & MILLER, NEw YoRK Cvx
PAcricE 3123.09
(1964).
194See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3123, supp. commentary 41 (1965).
29 8CPLR 3103(a).

(Emphasis added.)

